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IF OBSCENITY WERE TO DISCRIMINATE 
Barry P. McDonald* 
In her thoughtful essay, When Obscenity Discriminates,1 Professor 
Elizabeth Glazer argues that First Amendment obscenity doctrine, as it re-
lates to portrayals of gay and lesbian sex (―gay sex‖), violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and, somewhat paradoxically, 
the First Amendment itself.  More specifically, Professor Glazer appears to 
make a three-pronged argument.  First, current obscenity doctrine leaves 
open the possibility that, in application, juries or judges might find gay sex 
portrayals obscene simply because they involve same-sex acts (as opposed 
to obscene acts).  Second, this possibility in turn encourages censorship of 
sexual expression involving gay sex by private actors.  Finally, in view of 
the Court‘s decision in Lawrence v. Texas,2 the obscenity doctrine violates 
the Equal Protection Clause by causing such private discrimination, and al-
so violates the First Amendment because such discrimination is directed 
against the viewpoint that gay sex is equally as acceptable as heterosexual 
sex.  
While Glazer‘s thesis is creative and provocative, she does not address 
critical legal and empirical problems with her argument.  The first is the no-
tion that existing constitutional doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court can it-
self be unconstitutional because it might be applied in a manner that 
violates other constitutional doctrines.  While such applications of a doc-
trine might be unconstitutional if they were to occur, that does not render 
the doctrine itself unconstitutional.  The next problem is her idea that poten-
tial unconstitutional applications of a doctrine that purportedly encourage 
private actors to discriminate render the doctrine itself unconstitutional.  If 
solely private actors commit the ultimate discrimination, then there is no 
state action to support a claim of constitutional violation. 
Finally, there are significant empirical deficiencies with Glazer‘s ar-
gument.  She concedes there is little evidence that juries or judges actually 
apply the obscenity doctrine against gay sex portrayals in a discriminatory 
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1
  Elizabeth M. Glazer, When Obscenity Discriminates, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1379 (2008) (link). 
2
  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that adults have a substantive due process right to engage in consen-
sual sex with members of the same sex in the privacy of their own homes) (link). 
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discrimination by private parties.  But even here, Glazer attempts to make a 
case of private discrimination by focusing on the actions of just two private 
entities—the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and 
Google—where her ―proof‖ of discrimination involves highly anecdotal or 
limited information, which fails to establish anything definitive.  Moreover, 
Glazer provides no evidence to tie the allegedly discriminatory behavior of 
these two entities to the obscenity doctrine, relying instead on bare asser-
tions that the doctrine‘s treatment of gay sex portrayals causes such ―colla-
teral effects.‖3 
This Essay develops these criticisms of Professor Glazer‘s essay.  Part 
I discusses the lack of a sound legal or empirical basis for arguing that the 
obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional due to its claimed discriminatory col-
lateral effects.  Part II examines Glazer‘s argument as it might properly 
have been made: that if the discriminatory application of the obscenity doc-
trine against gay sex portrayals were to become an issue, the demands of a 
principled and coherent jurisprudence would require the Court to revisit that 
doctrine in light of Lawrence to clarify that the gay or lesbian nature of 
such portrayals is not a constitutional basis for deeming expression to be 
obscene.  I conclude that Glazer would have a strong argument in this re-
gard, but one that relies primarily on basic equal protection and First 
Amendment principles rather than on any changes wrought by Lawrence.  
I. OF DISCRIMINATION AND EMPIRICAL SUPPORT 
A. The State Action Requirement for Constitutional Violations 
Three basic interpretations of Professor Glazer‘s thesis appear possible, 
as suggested by the following statements she makes, respectively, in her in-
troduction and in her conclusion: ―Part IV elaborates the obscenity doc-
trine‘s discrimination against gays and lesbians on both equal protection 
and First Amendment grounds;‖4 and ―The collateral effects of the obsceni-
ty doctrine‘s current application have discriminated against gays and les-
bians.  Further, by so discriminating, the collateral effects of the doctrine 
have violated the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment itself.‖5 
The first possible interpretation, based on the statement from her intro-





  To be sure, in her Essay, Professor Glazer also appears to make a normative argument about the 
influence of the law on societal norms and how a potential reading of the obscenity doctrine to permit 
same-sex discrimination might undesirably encourage private actors to discriminate against content in-
volving gay sex (and perhaps against gays and lesbians generally).  Such an argument would certainly 
be defensible on social and legal policy grounds, but it is not the one on which Glazer chooses to make 
her principal stand. 
4
  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1386. 
5
  Id. at 1433. 
6
  See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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particular the three-part test set out by the Court in Miller v. California,7 is 
unconstitutional in light of Lawrence.8  But it is unusual to argue that a cur-
rent doctrine of the Court interpreting the First Amendment violates con-
temporaneous constitutional doctrines that interpret the same or other 
Amendments.9  The Court presumably formulates its doctrines with others 
in mind, and while there might at times be unresolved tensions and incon-
sistencies among them, to select one of them and label it unconstitutional 
seems jurisprudentially incorrect.  If perceived tensions between Lawrence 
and Miller were put squarely to the Court, it might choose the former as re-
quiring modification rather than the latter (versus the other way around, as 
Glazer would have it).  The point is that any tensions and uncertainties that 
might exist between new and old doctrines do not create an unconstitutional 
doctrine (or more appropriately a non-constitutional doctrine) until the 
Court identifies one as no longer constituting good law. 
The second possible interpretation of Glazer‘s thesis, based on the 
statement from her conclusion referenced above,10 is that alleged applica-
tions of the obscenity doctrine by juries and judges in a way that discrimi-
nates against portrayals of same-sex acts (i.e., an assertion of discriminatory 
enforcement or, at the least, disparate impact) are unconstitutional.  But 
Glazer appears to disclaim such an argument by virtue of her repeated as-
sertions that modern obscenity prosecutions are relatively rare, and that the 
obscenity doctrine is in ―disuse‖11 and has ―disappear[ed] from courts‘ 
dockets.‖12 
Perhaps this is why Glazer focuses on alleged ―collateral effects‖ of the 
obscenity doctrine on private actors.  She seems to argue principally that the 
unconstitutionality she asserts derives from the fact that the doctrine leaves 





  413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (―(a) whether ‗the average person, applying contemporary community 
standards‘ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value‖) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)) (link). 
8
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1419–33. 
9
  It is also an unusual argument because the Miller test is facially-neutral on the subject of homo-
sexuality; in providing criteria for what sexual expression is obscene or not, it makes no distinctions 
whatsoever between heterosexual and homosexual sex acts.  See supra note 7. 
10
  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
11
  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382. 
12
  Id. at 1383; see also id. at 1382, 1384, 1402–04, 1432–33.  Professor Glazer appears to be correct 
about the dearth of modern obscenity prosecutions.  See generally, e.g., Jason Krause, The End of the 
Net Porn Wars, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2008 (discussing the decline of federal obscenity prosecutions).  Never-
theless, she suggests that the doctrine had earlier been applied against gay sex in a discriminatory man-
ner by certain appellate courts—including the United States Supreme Court.  See Glazer, supra note 1, 
at 1399–1402.  However, none of the ―evidence‖ for this proposition that Glazer cites—the appellate 
court opinions and remarks by Professor William Eskridge—truly support it.  See infra note 19 and ac-
companying text. 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  COLLOQUY  
 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/31/ 75 
Miller test,13 which in turn induces private actors to discriminate against gay 
content.14  If, however, Glazer is arguing that the obscenity doctrine itself is 
unconstitutional because of possible unconstitutional applications of it, this 
simply does not fly.  The application of a constitutional doctrine in a way 
that violates other constitutional provisions does not make the doctrine it-
self unconstitutional.  One would have to argue, as Glazer does not, that the 
doctrine itself is unconstitutionally vague because it admits of unconstitu-
tional applications—an argument that would be subject to the same objec-
tions lodged above that one constitutional doctrine of the Court cannot 
violate another one of its contemporaneous doctrines. 
But Professor Glazer takes her argument even further, arguing that the 
obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional because potential discriminatory ap-
plications of it by juries or judges has the collateral effect of inducing actual 
discrimination by private parties.  This creates an additional problem.  
Where is the state action necessary to support a constitutional violation if 
the doctrine itself is not unconstitutional, there are no unconstitutional ap-
plications of it by government actors, and any actual discrimination is 
committed by private parties?15  Of course, the only way for Glazer to prop-
erly make this argument is to demonstrate how those private parties them-
selves can qualify as state actors under the exceptions to that doctrine 
recognized by the Court.16  However, she raises this issue solely as to one 
private actor she discusses but promptly abandons it, stating simply that 
―with respect to an assessment of the obscenity doctrine‘s collateral effects, 
it is unnecessary to determine the status of the MPAA.‖17  But why is this 
so?  Especially if one is going to later conclude, as noted above, that ―the 
collateral effects of the doctrine have violated both the Equal Protection 
Clause and the First Amendment itself.‖18  The bottom line is that unless 
Professor Glazer can demonstrate how the MPAA or Google can be consi-
dered to be state actors (which seems highly unlikely), any reliance on their 
alleged discrimination against gay content to prove a constitutional viola-






  The Miller test is facially neutral in the sense that it does not make sexual orientation the basis for 
determining what expression is obscene.  See supra note 7. 
14
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1432–33 (―The [obscenity] doctrine‘s refusal to distinguish between 
sex and sexual orientation has left open the possibility that content can be classified as obscene because 
it is either more naked, or, in the alternative, because it is more gay.‖). 
15
  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 6.4.1 (3d 
ed., 2006) (―The Constitution . . . generally does not apply to private entities or actors.‖). 
16
  See, e.g., id. § 6.4.4.1 (discussing the ―public functions‖ and ―entanglement‖ exceptions). 
17
  Glazer, supra note 1, 1405.  Glazer then proceeds to discuss the significant influence the MPAA 
has on the distribution of movies but never relates that discussion back to the recognized exceptions to 
the state action doctrine.  See id. at 1405–08. 
18
  Id. at 1433. 
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B. Empirical Problems 
Assuming Professor Glazer could make a tenable argument that the 
collateral discrimination she describes provides the basis for a constitutional 
violation, the evidence she presents for such discrimination is unpersuasive.  
To begin, although not absolutely vital to her argument since she focuses on 
the possible discriminatory application of the obscenity doctrine as foster-
ing collateral discrimination, it is noteworthy that Glazer provides little evi-
dence that juries or judges discriminate against gay sex portrayals in the 
first place.  Although she discusses a couple of state appellate court cases 
where gay sex portrayals were held to warrant obscenity-related convic-
tions, Glazer does not actually claim that these decisions (much less the un-
derlying convictions) were the product of bias against same-sex acts.19  





  See id. at 1400–01.  And nor would an examination of those decisions support such an assertion.  
See Tipp-It, Inc. v. Conboy, 596 N.W.2d 304 (Neb. 1999) (no reference by court in its Miller analysis to 
homosexuality being the basis for a finding of obscenity); State v. Millville Video, Inc., No. CA99-10-
179, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4192 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2000) (videotape of acts between both ho-
mosexual and heterosexual couples deemed to meet the Miller guidelines with specific emphasis on the 
sadomasochistic nature of the acts rather than the same-sex nature).  Glazer also cites to certain Supreme 
Court decisions and Professor William Eskridge‘s remarks on them to suggest that the obscenity doc-
trine had been applied in a discriminatory manner against gay sex in the past.  See Glazer, supra note 1, 
at 1400–01.  However, these citations do not support such a proposition.  None of the decisions Glazer 
relies on indicate that the Court found materials to be obscene because of their homosexual nature, and 
Professor Eskridge‘s statements claiming such discrimination are either bare assertions or are not sup-
ported by the cases he relies upon.  Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence v. Tex-
as and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1036–39 (2005) (citing and 
discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (link), and Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977) 
(link)) with Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 (in a case involving various heterosexual and homosexual images, the 
Court does not even acknowledge the homosexual nature of the images much less make that a basis of 
its decision) and Ward, 431 U.S. at 773 (in a case involving sadomasochistic materials, the Court did not 
reveal whether they involved heterosexual or homosexual acts, much less make their homosexual nature 
a basis of its affirmation of the lower courts‘ findings of obscenity). 
It should be noted that in Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 312, the Nebraska obscenity statute at issue in that 
case did label homosexual acts as one among other types of acts, including ―sexual intercourse,‖ that 
could qualify as being obscene (were it to meet other parts of the Miller test).  However, as noted above, 
the court essentially ignored this fact when applying that test to find that three gay images among twen-
ty-two displayed in a gay bar were obscene.  See Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 307, 312–15.  One might argue 
that, by singling out ―homosexuality‖ for potentially obscene treatment, the law itself constitutes evi-
dence of the type of discrimination against gay sex claimed by Glazer.  However, Glazer herself does 
not make this argument, presumably for two reasons.  First, the Nebraska law, by including ―sexual in-
tercourse‖ and ―prolonged physical contact with a person‘s clothed or unclothed genitals,‖ appeared to 
be taking a ―shotgun‖ approach to defining sexual acts that could qualify as obscene if they were suffi-
ciently prurient and offensive.  See Tipp-It, 596 N.W.2d at 312.  Accordingly, the law did not appear to 
be discriminating against gay sex as such.  Second, Glazer represented to this author that her research on 
laws defining what sexual acts could qualify as obscene under Miller revealed that they generally did not 
single out homosexual acts.  E-mail from Elizabeth M. Glazer, Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra 
University School of Law, to Barry P. McDonald, Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University 
School of Law (May 30, 2008, 9:08 a.m. PST) (on file with author). 
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doctrine‘s history must reflect the fact that not all cases involving depic-
tions of homosexuality have ended badly.‖20 
Nonetheless, Glazer concludes that ―[o]bscenity‘s past and present 
suggest that the doctrine has failed to distinguish between content that is 
obscene because it contains too much sex, and content that is obscene be-
cause it contains representations of gays and lesbians.‖21  Although the little 
evidence Glazer sets forth could ―suggest‖ virtually anything, it certainly 
does not establish a pattern of discrimination against gay sex portrayals in 
the application of the obscenity doctrine by juries and judges.22  She appears 
to concede this by noting repeatedly that modern obscenity prosecutions are 
few and far between,23 and by focusing on alleged collateral effects of such 
discrimination instead of that discrimination itself (despite the fact that the 
latter, of course, would have provided a much stronger basis for Glazer‘s 
constitutional claims).  
As for those discriminatory collateral effects, the evidence here is just 
as weak as the evidence supporting Professor Glazer‘s allegations of dis-
crimination by the courts.  Glazer focuses on the actions of two private par-
ties to make her case: the MPAA and Google.  With respect to the MPAA, 
the evidence of its discrimination against gay content because of its gay na-
ture consists mainly of anecdotal statements of film industry ―insiders‖ and 
very general comparisons of the ratings received by films containing hete-
rosexual sex scenes versus those containing gay sex scenes.24  Once again, 
Glazer forthrightly concedes that ―[i]t is surely possible that the MPAA 
rated the films whose scenes this section highlights with a particular rating 
for reasons other than the sexual orientation of its characters.‖25 
As to Google, Professor Glazer ran searches of the phrase ―having sex‖ 
on Google Images using three different SafeSearch Filtering programs 
Google offers to ―exclude[] most explicit images from Google Image 
Search Results‖26—a ―strict‖ filtering option, a ―moderate‖ filtering option, 
and no filtering at all.  She asserts that of the first twenty images her 
searches returned, the strict setting returned four depicting sex (all four in-
volving heterosexuals), the moderate setting returned eight depicting sex 
(all eight involving heterosexuals), and the no filtering setting returned 
twelve depicting sex (eight involving heterosexuals and four involving ho-
mosexuals).  From these results, Glazer suggests that Google has a ―Gay 
Filter,‖ as the heading of her section asserts.  Putting aside the puzzling si-





  Glazer, supra note 1, at 1401. 
21
  Id. at 1402. 
22
  See supra notes 12 & 19 and accompanying text. 
23
  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1382, 1384, 1402–04, 1432–33. 
24
  See id. at 1408–11. 
25
  Id. at 1408. 
26
  Id. at 1410 n.206 (omission in original). 
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ty),27 all Glazer has shown is that a particular search on one of Google‘s 
numerous search engines, using different settings of its filtering software, 
returned homosexual sex images solely under the unfiltered option while re-
turning some heterosexual sex images under all of the filtering options.  
While it is possible that Google‘s filtering software screens out gay sex 
content, it is also possible that these results can be accounted for by a num-
ber of other plausible explanations—such as the possibility that the homo-
sexual images searched by Google‘s engine were more explicit than the 
heterosexual images it searched (a major feature targeted by the filters).  
But in any event, Glazer candidly concedes that it is impossible to know 
whether Google Image‘s complex software algorithms are designed to filter 
gay sex content.28 
To be sure, Glazer openly disclaims any intent to have this one search 
―experiment,‖ or her discussion of MPAA film ratings, establish with any 
certainty that either Google or the MPAA discriminate against gay sex con-
tent because of its gay nature.29  But at the same time she makes several 
statements to the effect that she is ―offering and analyzing data that seek to 
demonstrate [systematic] biases against homosexual content in two major 
media,‖30 and also argues generally that the obscenity doctrine is in fact un-
constitutionally producing discriminatory collateral effects—presumably on 
the basis of her MPAA and Google ―data‖ since she offers no other evi-
dence of such discrimination.  Glazer cannot have it both ways.  Either she 
must construct an argument that is consistent with the notion that her ―evi-
dence‖ of collateral discrimination is, at best, suggestive despite its highly 
speculative nature, or she must produce sounder and more comprehensive 
evidence of such discrimination on which to base her claims of constitu-
tional violation. 
Finally, and even more problematically, Glazer offers no evidence that, 
even if some important private actors discriminate against gay sex content 
because of its gay nature, they are doing so as a result of anything the ob-





  Of course, the exclusion of the remaining images completely distorts any statistical inferences 
Glazer attempts to draw, even at this very crude level of empirical analysis. 
28
  See id. at 1409 (―[S]ome search engine algorithms are so complicated that determining why a 
computer made a particular decision to filter some content, but not other content, may be impossible.‖). 
29
  See id. at 1402, 1403, 1408, 1409, 1411. 
30
  Id. at 1403; see also id. at 1404, 1405, 1407. 
31
  Once again, the closest Professor Glazer comes to providing such evidence are some unsupported 
assertions by Professor William Eskridge that the vagueness of the Miller framework has caused dis-
crimination against gay sex content.  See id. at 1404 & nn.173–74.  Although in the passage relied on by 
Glazer, Eskridge asserts that ―after Miller v. California[, 413 U.S. 15] (1973) some communities banned 
lesbian or gay romances as well as oral and anal sex,‖ he provides no citations to support that assertion 
and, most importantly, no evidence linking such actions, even if they were motivated by an anti-
homosexual animus, to the Miller decision (particularly since Miller involved heterosexual and homo-
sexual pornography, and not the regulation of ―romances‖ or physical sex acts themselves).  See 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 202–04 (2002). 
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is neutral on the issue of whether the homosexual nature of sexual expres-
sion makes it more or less obscene.  Thus, Glazer is forced to argue that the 
mere possibility that juries or judges will discriminate in applying the Miller 
test encourages private actors to treat gay sex portrayals more restrictively 
than heterosexual ones.  To state the argument is to reveal its tenuousness.  
Even assuming enough private actors are aware of one obscure aspect of a 
concededly ―disused‖ legal doctrine, to create the ―implicit yet pervasive‖32 
societal discrimination Glazer alleges, it is a much further stretch to infer 
discriminatory causation from it.  It seems much more plausible that if ac-
tors like the MPAA and Google engage in such discrimination, it simply 
stems from their independent determinations (however much Glazer would 
argue they were misplaced) that gay sex content is particularly inappro-
priate for minors (in the case of the MPAA ―R‖ ratings, which Glazer 
claims discriminatorily excludes such content),33 or for both minors and 
adults that might be using Google Images in its normal default setting of a 
―moderate‖ filtering option.34  This is especially true considering that, as 
private actors, neither the MPAA nor Google need to concern themselves 
about claimed constitutional violations from treating gay sex content diffe-
rently than heterosexual sex content.  It is not as if they need legal cover to 
discriminate, assuming they actually do, by relying on obscenity doctrine to 
claim that gay sex portrayals are inherently obscene and, thus, can or should 
be more heavily restricted. 
In sum, although Glazer‘s arguments regarding the obscenity doc-
trine‘s unconstitutionality are creative, unless she can lay a firmer founda-
tion for state action and the empirical claims she makes, those arguments 
would be substantially strengthened by recasting them into less ambitious—
but no less productive from her viewpoint—claims that I will discuss in 
Part II. 
II. THE LAWRENCE EFFECT 
Professor Glazer makes two arguments as to why Lawrence renders the 
obscenity doctrine unconstitutional.  First, from an equal protection stand-
point, that decision lays down a ―broad equality principle‖ mandating ―that 
the obscenity doctrine cannot weigh one‘s sexual minority status when im-
plementing the Miller test.‖35  Second, from a First Amendment perspective, 
because the Lawrence Court‘s attitude towards gay sex shifted from view-
ing it as a disfavored subject to a viewpoint that sees it as ―simply another 
way that individuals might engage in sex . . . , obscenity‘s discrimination 





  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1385 (―The collateral effect of failing to distinguish gay and lesbian 
content from obscenity has been an implicit yet pervasive sanctioning of the censoring of gay content.‖). 
33
  See id. at 1404–08. 
34
  See id. at 1410–11. 
35
  Id. at 1419. 
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point-discriminatory restriction on speech.‖36  Since I have already argued 
that Glazer‘s claims of unconstitutionality go too far, I will take the liberty 
of recasting these arguments as more modest claims that the obscenity doc-
trine needs to be modified in light of Lawrence in order to achieve a prin-
cipled and coherent constitutional jurisprudence as it relates to the Court‘s 
treatment of gay sex (including expressions of it).  Presumably, the modifi-
cation urged by her would be one making clear that the gay nature of sex 
portrayals is an illegitimate factor for juries or judges to consider in apply-
ing the Miller test. 
I conclude that Glazer‘s equal protection argument has some merit to 
the extent it suggests that such a modification would be warranted if the is-
sue of obscenity discrimination against gay sex portrayals were demonstrat-
ed to be a real problem.  But unlike Glazer, I see this as an issue of the 
interplay of basic equal protection and First Amendment principles—and 
specifically the prohibition against content discrimination—rather than an 
extension of equal protection principles from Lawrence.  I also conclude 
that Glazer‘s First Amendment viewpoint discrimination argument mis-
conceives the nature of that doctrine, its application in this context, and the 
relevance of Lawrence to this issue.  Instead of arguing that obscenity dis-
crimination against gay sex portrayals would constitute impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination pursuant to changes wrought by Lawrence, Glazer 
would do better to rest her argument squarely on the content discrimination 
principles I discuss in Part A below. 
A. Of Lawrence, Equal Protection and First Amendment Principles 
With respect to her equal protection argument, in what Glazer con-
cedes is a ―broad interpretation‖ of Lawrence, she argues that the decision 
stands for the proposition that homosexual persons have an ―equal right . . .  
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.‖37  As translated into the domain 
of assessing the constitutionality of restrictions on sexually-explicit expres-
sion, Glazer argues that this principle demands the Court alter the Miller 
test to prevent any ―conflation of sex and sexual orientation.‖38  Glazer‘s ar-
gument essentially raises the question of whether the Court would deter-
mine that such a modification to, or clarification of, the Miller test was 
called for in light of Lawrence. 
Lawrence was a substantive due process decision where the Court held 
that the state lacks a sufficient interest to punish consensual sexual activity 
between homosexual adults conducted in the privacy of the home.39  Miller 





  Id. 
37
  See id. at 1416 n.247 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38
  Id. at 1422. 
39
  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564–79 (2003) (link). 
40
  413 U.S. 49 (1973) (link). 
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hand, addressed a state‘s ability to prohibit, consistent with the First 
Amendment, the public distribution or movie theatre exhibition of porno-
graphic media.  The Court justified its rulings that the state could so prohi-
bit materials adjudged to be obscene under the Miller test by reference to 
the protection of minors, the sensibilities of unwilling viewers, and, in the 
case of movie theatre exhibitions where exposing minors or unwilling 
viewers might not be a problem, the right ―to maintain a decent society.‖41  
In other words, with respect to materials that, in the words of Miller, are 
considered by an average person of a community to be designed to appeal 
to a prurient or lascivious interest in sex and contain ―patently offensive‖ 
depictions of it,42 both individual and societal interests in avoiding exposure 
to, or having the community affected by, public dealing in them outweighs 
an individual‘s right to distribute or receive them.  Most pertinently, the 
Miller-Paris Adult Theatre framework grants members of a given commu-
nity a qualified right to say what sexual materials are unduly lascivious and 
offensive when they enter public channels of distribution,43 while Lawrence 
says that the public has an insufficient interest in making similar determina-
tions about intimate sexual acts that take place in private.44 
The question that follows is whether Lawrence places constraints on a 
community‘s ability, in exercising its qualified right to control public deal-
ings in extremely offensive materials, to define portrayed sex acts as unduly 
lascivious and offensive at least in part because they involve homosexual 
conduct.  One response might be that if a given community is allowed to 
determine for itself what materials are too lascivious and offensive to be 
traded publicly, it is difficult to see why, if gay sex portrayals are inherently 
lascivious and offensive in its eyes (perhaps because there is a very low in-
cidence of it within that community and it is viewed as ―abnormal‖), it 
should not be allowed to make that determination.  Under Miller, the argu-





  Id. at 59–60 & n.10, 69 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court in Paris Adult Theatre also 
implied that the preservation of public morality and the prevention of antisocial conduct were additional 
grounds for banning the public distribution of obscene materials.  See id. at 57–62.  And, of course, the 
Court assesses all of these interests in relation to its view that obscene ―utterances are no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.‖  Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 20–21 (1973) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (link). 
42
  Miller, 413 U.S. at 24–25. 
43
  I say ―qualified‖ because before a work can be deemed legally obscene, a judge must, under Mil-
ler‘s third prong, also find that it, taken as a whole, lacks serious value.  See id.  This prong has been 
interpreted to require as a reference a national standard, as opposed to the standards of a given commu-
nity.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 11.3.4.2.  Accordingly, this prong effectively prevents a 
community—especially a conservative one—from finding materials obscene that the nation generally 
would say had some serious artistic or literary value. 
44
  Accordingly, the analog to Lawrence in the obscenity arena is not Miller or Paris Adult Theatre, 
but rather the Court‘s decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (link), where it held that the 
mere private possession of obscene materials could not be criminalized consistent with the First 
Amendment. 
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democratic, and Lawrence does not change that basic proposition as to pub-
lic dealing in pornographic materials.  On the other hand, it could be argued 
that the respect and dignity owed to the personal decisions of gays and les-
bians about their private sexual conduct extend equally to the commercial 
(in most cases) production, distribution, or consumption of gay pornogra-
phy, even within a community that does not generally accept such homo-
sexual practices.  Further, the argument would continue, if a community 
tolerates a certain level of heterosexual pornography, then should it not be 
forced to accept a similar level of gay sex pornography as well?  Does it, in 
light of Lawrence, unconstitutionally demean gays and lesbians by permit-
ting the former but criminalizing the latter? 
As mentioned above, Lawrence was a substantive due process case 
while the most appropriate claim here is one of equal protection as to First 
Amendment rights—i.e., the ability to distribute or receive gay sex expres-
sion ―on a par‖ with heterosexual sex expression.  It should be noted, how-
ever, that Lawrence did contain strong overtones that, at least as to the issue 
of private, consensual adult sex, gays and lesbians were entitled to equal 
protection with respect to criminal laws seeking to regulate such conduct.45  
Does such a principle extend into the realm of ―determining obscenity?‖  
As a basic question of equal protection law, the Court‘s decision in Romer 
v. Evans46 appears to be the most apposite case.  There the Court declined to 
treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification warranting the application 
of formal heightened scrutiny to alleged discrimination against gays and 
lesbians, but did apply a form of ―heightened‖ rational basis review to hold 
that laws imposing special disabilities on gays and lesbians were generally 
illegitimate—and in particular when such laws appear to have been moti-
vated by nothing but animus towards those groups.47 
Does the ―obscenity discrimination‖ claimed by Professor Glazer run 
afoul of this principle?  This is debatable.  As noted earlier, the Miller test 
does not single out gays or lesbians for disfavored treatment—any discrim-
ination of the sort at issue here would be a case-by-case determination by 
juries or judges about lasciviousness and offensiveness.  However, one 
could argue that if a jury or judge were to single out gay content for ob-
scene treatment simply because of its gay nature, this would be imposing a 
special disability on gays or lesbians.  But would such discrimination be the 
result of a bare animus towards those groups?  Is offensiveness the same 
thing as animus?  Certainly not in all cases.  One can be offended by things 
people do without disliking or hating them as well.  Similar reasoning ap-
plies to determinations about prurience.  Nonetheless, there is certainly 





  See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003) (link). 
46
  517 U.S. 620 (1996) (link). 
47
  See id. at 631–32. 
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In any event, it appears that a different line of equal protection prin-
ciples—based not on the suspect status of the differential treatment of gays 
and lesbians but instead on whether alleged discrimination unduly interferes 
with the exercise of a fundamental right—may be more pertinent to this is-
sue.  The Court has held that when the differential treatment of groups im-
pairs unduly the exercise of a fundamental right, that treatment is subjected 
to strict scrutiny and generally held to be unconstitutional.48  This raises the 
question of whether the alleged discrimination in ―determining obscenity‖ 
may be said to unduly impair the exercise of a fundamental right.  In Law-
rence, the Court declined to characterize the right to engage in private, con-
sensual sex acts as a fundamental right, although it treated the asserted 
liberty interest as one deserving of an unspecified form of heightened scru-
tiny.49  As noted earlier, the liberty interest being asserted in the obscenity 
context implicates First Amendment concerns: the right to distribute and re-
ceive gay sex content on a par with heterosexual sex content.  Does such an 
interest implicate fundamental rights? 
Certainly the Court has held that the right to send or receive protected 
expression is a fundamental liberty interest under the First Amendment.  
And even with respect to making determinations about the protected or un-
protected status of pornographic materials, at least in the prior restraint con-
text, the Court has held that substantial First Amendment interests are 
implicated—for example, placing the burden of proof and other procedural 
burdens on a state censor as to whether pornographic films are obscene.50  
Thus it seems that the Court would also be likely to treat the ―determining 
obscenity‖ problem in the subsequent punishment context as also implicat-
ing important First Amendment interests.  Assuming this to be the case, 
then, would the Court also believe that the alleged obscenity discrimination 
against gay sex portrayals unduly interferes with such First Amendment 
rights? 
To answer this question, we must look to the central First Amendment 
principle disfavoring content discrimination by the state, which rests largely 
upon equal protection principles in any event (thus demonstrating that these 
two bodies of law overlap to a significant extent).51  Of course, when the 
government discriminates against protected expression on the basis of its 
content, the Court normally applies strict scrutiny and holds the discrimina-
tion to be unconstitutional (the basic idea being that it is not the govern-
ment‘s place to judge the worth or value of various expression).52  When 





  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 10.1. 
49
  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564–79.  
50
  See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57–59 (1965) (link). 
51
  See, e.g., Police Dep‘t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94–95 (1972) (link). 
52
  This principle against content discrimination is consistent with the Court‘s treatment, in the basic 
equal protection context of differential classifications that impair the exercise of a fundamental right.  
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 10.1. 
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Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul53 essentially followed the same approach 
with the exception of recognizing that content discrimination that does not 
present a ―significant danger of idea or viewpoint discrimination‖54 is gen-
erally unobjectionable.  But what about content discrimination that occurs 
within the process of determining whether certain expression is protected or 
unprotected under standards defined by the Court?  Of course this very 
process inherently involves content discrimination, but the question here is 
whether the ―second-level‖ content discrimination that would occur if a jury 
or judge were to determine that sex materials were unduly lascivious or of-
fensive because of their homosexual nature would offend the principle 
against content discrimination generally. 
As to this question, we might look at the extent to which such second-
ary content discrimination would implicate the concerns animating the gen-
eral content discrimination prohibition, as well as the extent to which such 
secondary discrimination might be justified by the reasons that have tradi-
tionally permitted an exception to the general prohibition as to obscene con-
tent.  Although the Court and commentators have asserted different 
justifications for generally disfavoring content discrimination by the gov-
ernment,55 I have argued previously that the principal one is a concern that 
the government would engage in such discrimination to censor views, ideas, 
or information for illegitimate reasons56—in this case, suppressing gay sex 
content out of mere distaste or animus instead of attempting to mitigate 
harms from it the government can legitimately seek to address. 
But what is that harm in the context of obscenity regulation?  As dis-
cussed earlier, the Court allows publicly distributed pornographic content to 
be discriminated against on the basis of the level of its lasciviousness and 
offensiveness.  Those reasons have to do with the low ―truth‖ value of ex-
treme pornographic material and its potential harm to societal interests in 
shielding youths, adults and the greater community from conduct and mate-
rials that threaten society‘s interests in preserving minimum levels of de-
cency and morality.57  This raises the question of whether gay sex content 
implicates these concerns to a significantly greater degree than similarly 
pornographic heterosexual content.  In other words, would a jury or judge 
act legitimately in censoring gay sex content because of these concerns 
while giving a ―pass‖ to heterosexual fare that was similar, or even ―worse,‖ 
in terms of lasciviousness or offensiveness?  It seems not.  Smut is smut, 
and in terms of the obscenity-related harms the government can legitimately 





  505 U.S. 377 (1992) (link). 
54
  Id. at 388. 
55
  See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to Protect-
ing the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349 n.3, 1389–94 (2006). 
56
  Id. at 1348–49 & n.3. 
57
  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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involve heterosexual or same-sex actors.  In this context, there would also 
be a significant risk that such discrimination might frequently be based on a 
mere distaste or animus towards gay or lesbian behavior versus a legitimate 
concern about harms that might be caused by the public distribution of ob-
scene material generally. 
Accordingly, there is a strong argument that equal protection and First 
Amendment principles prohibit the sort of claimed discrimination in apply-
ing obscenity doctrine which concerns Professor Glazer.  Thus, if this be-
came an issue for the Court, it very well might be willing to modify the 
Miller test to clarify that the homosexual nature of a gay sex portrayal is not 
a legitimate factor for a jury or judge to consider in determining whether it 
was unduly lascivious or offensive under that test.  However, in my view, 
such a clarification has less to do with Lawrence and more to do with the 
application of basic equal protection and First Amendment principles to this 
relatively narrow point of law. 
B. Of Lawrence and Viewpoint Discrimination 
Professor Glazer also argues that Lawrence marked a transformation in 
the Court‘s attitude towards gay sex, from viewing it as a questionable sub-
ject (e.g., an ―odd‖ practice) to a viewpoint that it is just another way for 
people to have sex.  And ―[o]nce homosexuality so transforms, discrimina-
tion against content in light of its homosexuality‖ constitutes viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of the First Amendment.58  Glazer‘s underlying 
premise is that if the Court viewed the alleged discrimination against gay 
sex portrayals as mere subject matter discrimination it might not violate that 
Amendment since the Court has been inconsistent in its views as to whether 
the content discrimination principle prohibits subject matter discrimination.  
On the other hand, she argues, the Court has been clear that viewpoint dis-
crimination violates that principle. 
Setting aside the issues of whether the Court truly had or has such 
views about gay sex and whether such a transformation occurred in Law-
rence (both of which seem highly debatable), this argument is problematic 
for another reason.  Assuming one could equate the Court‘s attitude towards 
gay sex conducted in private with the commercial production and distribu-
tion of gay pornography (another proposition that seems highly debatable), 
under First Amendment doctrine whether the Court itself views certain ex-
pression as merely pertaining to a subject or also embodying a viewpoint is 
largely irrelevant.  The question is whether, in the context in which it oc-
curred, the government actors that allegedly discriminated against certain 
expression did so because of its subject matter or because of viewpoints it 
may have reflected.  Accordingly, with respect to Glazer‘s alleged discrimi-
nation, the question would be whether juries or judges purportedly finding 





  See Glazer, supra note 1, at 1425. 
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nature, were doing so because they were hostile to the basic notion of ho-
mosexual sex or because they were hostile to a perceived viewpoint reflect-
ed in such content that gay pornography was just as acceptable as hetero-
heterosexual pornography.  It would likely be some of both.  So it is not 
clear that it matters whether such discrimination is characterized to be on 
the basis of subject matter or viewpoint.  But even if it were mere subject 
matter discrimination, I cannot agree with Glazer‘s premise that there is a 
significant question as to whether it would violate the content discrimina-
tion principle.  Unlike the older cases on which Glazer bases her argu-
ment,59 in recent decades the Court has been fairly clear that subject matter 
discrimination by the government is equally as problematic as viewpoint 
discrimination even if it reserves its strongest rhetoric for the latter: ―Regu-
lation of the subject matter of messages, though not as obnoxious as view-
point-based regulation, is also an objectionable form of content-based 
regulation.‖60 
Ultimately, then, as discussed in Part II.A., I agree with Professor 
Glazer‘s thesis to the extent it suggests there is a strong argument that gay 
sex obscenity discrimination by juries or judges, were it to exist, would 
constitute impermissible content discrimination.  But I part ways with her 
argument that Lawrence affects this calculus due to a purported shift in the 
Court‘s attitude towards gay sex.  In my view, Lawrence has little relevance 
to this issue.  Finally, even if that decision was relevant, Glazer‘s argument 
regarding viewpoint discrimination ignores the complexities, discussed 
above, that such alleged discrimination would be occurring within a process 
that inherently calls for content discrimination by government actors.  This 
would not be an issue, as Glazer seems to portray it by her heavy reliance 
on R.A.V.,61 of content discrimination within a category of expression that 
had already been determined to lack First Amendment protection. 
CONCLUSION 
In her essay, Professor Glazer makes a creative and intriguing argu-
ment that the obscenity doctrine is unconstitutional because of the discrimi-
natory collateral effects it purportedly generates.  While this Essay has 
discussed several legal and empirical problems with this argument, it has 
concluded that her core insight—that the Miller obscenity test should be 





  See id. at 1391–93 (discussing cases from the 1970s when content discrimination principle was 
first emerging).  Many of the cases examined by Glazer also involved the government regulating speech 
in special capacities—such as postmaster, property proprietor, or the military—where greater content 
discrimination is generally allowed by the Court (and especially on the basis of subject matter catego-
ries) as opposed to when the government regulates speech in its capacity as general sovereign.  See 
McDonald, supra note 55, at 1350 & n.5. 
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  Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (link). 
61
  See, e.g., Glazer, supra note 1, at 1394–96, 1430–32. 
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nent actors—appears to have substantial support in basic principles of the 
Court‘s equal protection and First Amendment jurisprudence. 
